and the justificatory drivers for biosecurity have shifted from a sole focus on agriculture to encompass concern for native ecosystems (Williams and West, 2000) . This historical depth provides an opportunity to view`biosecurity' as a multifaceted and contingent response within shifting institutional and public values. During this time New Zealand has evolved a complex hierarchical system of control responses to a dizzying array of nonnative organisms, classified as threats in a variety of ways. This control hierarchy ranges from a national ban on the importation of`new' organisms prior to detailed environmental impact assessments, to the controlled management of existing pests. (2) New Zealand's contemporary regime has been described as the most comprehensive and integrated biosecurity system in the world (Fasham and Trumper, 2001) .
Critical social science accounts of biosecurity are emerging from a number of starting points. These accounts draw on a lineage of approaches to theorising nature or the nonhuman within cultural geography (Clark, 2002; Hinchliffe, 2001; Whatmore, 1999; Willems-Braun, 1997) , the histories of ecology and biology (Cronon, 1995; Glacken, 1976; Kwa, 1987; Worster, 1994) , science studies (Haraway, 1991; Latour, 1987) , cultural studies (Wilson, 1991) , political economy and ecology (Castree, 1995; Soper, 1995) , and aligned literatures. These approaches have in different ways expressed`d issatisfaction with the binary terms through which the question of nature has been posed'' (Whatmore, 2002, page 165) . They have highlighted, and criticised, the significance of conceptual and material boundaries between`nature' and`culture' in environmental governance, and moved away from the use of such boundaries in the production of nondualist academic accounts of the nonhuman. In pushing aside prior representations of nature as static and immutable, these critical literatures draw attention to nonhuman mobility and indeterminacy (Hinchliffe, 2001; Wynne, 1992) . Academic attention to the construction of conceptual and material boundaries in environmental management practices has included consideration of the processes of categorisation that produce and police these boundaries (see for example Lien, 2005; Lulka, 2004; Murdoch and Low, 2003) . Categorisation leads to a loss of detail and a simplification, by fixing the identity of nonhumans, reaffirming the externality of nature and ignoring cultural connections to landscape (Katz, 1998; Scott, 1998; Willems-Braun, 1997) . This approach to governing nature is seen as pervasive in Western environmental sensibilities and is presented as operating within a purifying logic, comparable with ethnic cleansing (Whatmore, 1999) .
This assumption permeates social science accounts of biosecurity. Hinchliffe (2001) , in a consideration of the British government's response to BSE (bovine spongiform encephalopathy), argues that attempts to govern mobile and unstable entities fail to recognise their indeterminacy, which has been revealed by these critical accounts. In contrast, Braun's (2007) account of global biosecurity and concerns over bird flu considers the implications of indeterminacy forming the basis of political rationality. He characterises the affect of biosecurity as fear and dread, arguing that state action is rationalised through appeals to immanent danger. In a discussion of the UK's biosecurity responses to FMD, Donaldson and Wood (2004, page 386 ) present a picture of biosecurity as``the maintenance of static territorial integrity''. They describe biosecurity developing over the course of the FMD crisis to become (2) The Environmental Risk Management Authority undertakes environmental impact assessment and consultation for any new organism that was not in New Zealand on or before July 1997, to establish its eligibility for importation. The process costs the importer up to NZ $35 000 (Rennie, 2005) , and is understood to have effectively halted the legal importation of new plant species.
``a highly spatialised form of control, reliant on the creation and maintenance of tightly categorised territories through control of physical movement and information'' (pages 373^374). Biosecurity becomes the crude and oppressive imposition of boundaries, an inflexible and rigid response to biological emergence, mismatched to the geographies of the governing context (Donaldson and Wood, 2004; Law, 2006) . In a later article Donaldson and Wood (2007) highlight the association between territory and movement within biosecurity. However, territory remains a product of biosecurity practices, while movement is again confined to the global circulations of animals, animal diseases, and pathogens which give rise to biosecurity threats.
These approaches imply a naivety within expert attempts to enact biosecurity governance: that control will be straightforward and predictable. This representation of reduced sensitivity and flexibility towards changing scientific knowledges, changing values, and changing organisms, stands in stark contrast to the depictions of the entities themselves. This conflicting picture of indeterminate materialities and deterministic political approaches is used to explain the`failures' of biosecurity decision making, told through the monstrous stories of BSE, FMD, and bird flu (Braun, 2007; Donaldson, 2008; Donaldson and Wood, 2004; Hinchliffe, 2001; Hinchliffe and Bingham, 2008; Law, 2006; Law and Mol, forthcoming; Nerlich and Wright, 2006) .
There is a danger that critical social science accounts of biosecurity, by following dramatic events which are dramatic because they entail failures, will tell particular stories to the detriment of others. In contrast, I will argue that not all attempts to govern are brittle, unreflexive, and unresponsive to natural indeterminacy or to shifting human values, and are therefore not`failing' policies. I hope to unsettle the assumptions presented above by arguing that the policy tools drawn on in New Zealand's plant biosecurity regime represent a real attempt to match control responses to the indeterminate spatiotemporalities of pest plants.
This paper, therefore, has two related aims. Firstly, to reflect the greater spatiotemporal complexity and flexibility in biosecurity-related boundaries and categorisation processes utilised in New Zealand. This is informed by the nuanced treatment of boundaries within Mol and Law's (2005) editorial. Through a series of probing and expansive questions, they unravel key assumptions about the fixity attributed to boundaries in understandings of space and identity. Drawing on biological imagery, it becomes possible to imagine boundaries that are blurred, that move around, that fold (Mol and Law, 2005) . Mobility remains possible in spite of boundaries erected, or even because of the imbalances created by boundaries (Law, 2006) . In dealing explicitly with a biosecurity concern, Law and Mol (2008, page 136 ) go on to highlight that``boundary making is far more complex cartographically than the traces it leaves on a map. Indeed, the techniques most central to it are not located at geographical borders at all.'' Secondly, this paper will offer an alternative story of biosecurity policy and practice to this growing body of literature, in which complex, decentred, and flexible accommodations are made to an invasive entity. To do this I use the example of gorse to detail the contemporary biosecurity regime and longer history of evolving responses to bioinvasion in New Zealand. Whilst gorse is listed as one of the`100 world's worst weeds' in the IUCN's Global Invasive Species Database (Lowe et al, 2000) , it is still one of the more mundane examples I could have chosen. Gorse is widely spread throughout the world and in nearly every suitable habitat in New Zealand, where its dense infestations are a familiar sight. This choice is, however, purposeful. The practice of biosecurity is not simply about emergency responses, but also about controlling the pervasive, mundane strangeness that is alien nature. I therefore attempt to bring into question biosecurity as a fully authoritative mode of governance, by showing how it can work.
Introducing gorse: entanglements, indeterminacies, and change The broad processes of the recombination of life to and from the Antipodes, which forms the backdrop to contemporary biosecurity attempts in these countries, has been theorised by environmental historians and geographers (notably A Clark, 1949; N Clark, 2002; Clayton, 2003; Crosby, 1986; Diamond, 1997 : Dunlap, 1999 Flannery, 1994; Frost, 1996; Miller, 1996; Star, 2003) . This literature is notable for its attention to the biological or material in explanations for the success of European settlement, and has therefore been influential on more recent attempts to engage nonhumans in accounts of`social' change. Crosby (1986) coined the term`portmanteau biota' to describe the assortment of European coadapted species (micro and macro flora and fauna) intentionally and accidentally transported to the Antipodes, which supported the establishment of European settler societies. These foot soldiers of colonisation (Guthrie-Smith, 1999 [1921 ) swept across the`newly discovered' countries, catalysing a myriad of changes (Bright, 1999; Flannery, 1994) . Gorse was imported to New Zealand for use as a hedgerow plant to delimit pastures during the earliest stages of European settlement. (3) Gorse is an evergreen, woody, spiny, perennial shrub which grows to between 3 and 5 m in height. It has prickly reduced leaves, a deep taproot, extensive lateral roots just below the soil surface, and the ability to resprout from the base (Williams, 1997) . These properties interacted with specific factors of New Zealand's regional environment such as harsh winds and poor soil, making it an ideal choice for hedgerow to contain stock.
Social science accounts of this historic global redistribution of plants and animals have a strong focus on how things were able to move successfully without changing. In the context of invasive species, however, change is crucial. Whether invasive species are the cause or a diagnostic symptom of human-induced environmental change is a question within debates over native/alien species (see Harper, 2002; Warren, 2007) . Significant for the human impulse to control these flows is the emerging understanding that these are not the only changes brought about by the`radical effects of displacement':`T he host environment may be altered irrevocably by the presence of a new organism but so too, inevitably, is the one who runs wild transformed by the terrain in which it insinuates itself '' (Clark, 2003, page 166) . This evolutionary adaptation is described by Clark (2003, page 175) as`biological improvisation': physiological divergence due to the consequences of displacement from the organism's`natural' habitat into a new situation where it is free from predators and pathogens, and can enjoy a beneficial climate. Gorse responded to its relocation to New Zealand by producing its abundant small, bright yellow flowers for longer periods and by growing to a greater height than in its native ranges. These changes, one of à`t housand variations on the theme of its own form'' (Dening, 1980, pages 31^32) , have implications for the rate at which gorse propagates and spreads. Refusing to behave as a neat property marker, gorse absconded, choking pastures and overgrowing roads. In 1859 the provincial governments of Taranaki and Nelson passed laws imposing the trimming of gorse hedges, in an attempt to keep these boundaries clear-cut (Worsley, 1999) .
This challenges the purity of the conceptual boundary between nature and culture in a further way. Running opposite to the typical Edenic story of the irreversible acculturation of nature, these invasive species often started as domesticated and`cultured' nature in the new countries, but became progressively more wild or`natural' (Clark, 2003, page 172) . So, while the aim of acclimatisation practices was to change the environment, it was the assumed existence of incontestable natural entities underpinning these practices that contributed, as Hinchliffe (2001) suggests, to the ensuing environmental problems. For Star (2003) this again instigated further change, as the environmental damage provoked changing attitudes towards the practice of acclimatisation itself. The potential for transformation is therefore expanded beyond the environmental and biological to include the cultural within this complex instability. The ensuing century witnessed a variety of governance responses towards the spreading infestations of gorse. Despite its invasive tendencies, the enduring utility of gorse as a hedgerow plant allowed it to overlap the categorical boundary between useful and nuisance plant, provoking conflict and legislative difficulties for the 1900, 1928, and 1950 Noxious Plants Acts (Bagge, 2000) . In field subdivision after World War 2, post-and-wire fences were used in preference to gorse. Its seed, however, is viable for up to eighty years in the soil. The added shelter these fences provided from cropping resulted in what are termed`volunteer hedges' springing up alongside and eventually engulfing the new field boundaries (Price, 1993) . Despite an intensive government-subsidised herbicide-spraying campaign in the 1970s and 1980s, gorse grew back.
Gorse and New Zealand's contemporary biosecurity regime
The period since 1993 constitutes a discrete phase of intensive national biosecurity policy development, distinguishable by institution building and legislation intensification. The Biosecurity Act (1993) and the Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act (1996) form the legislative backbone of the contemporary regime. Following a strategy review completed in 2003, Biosecurity New Zealand (BNZ), a newly formed offshoot of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, was made responsible for overseeing the entire biosecurity system. The Department of Conservation (DoC), regional councils, the Ministry of Health, and the Ministry of Fisheries also have biosecurity responsibilities in different domains. The biosecurity regime is constituted by five main programmes or`sites' of policy intervention which reflect the different stages of biosecurity-related incursions: preborder surveillance, border surveillance, postborder surveillance, incursion response, and pest management activities. At each of these sites the interaction of legislation and governing institutions produces specific cultures of practice. The Biosecurity Act (1993) has effect across all five sites. Introducing the term biosecurity' into legislation for the first time (Jay and Morad, 2006), the Act is``a law specifically to support systematic protection of ... biological systems ... from the harmful effects of exotic pests and diseases'' (Biosecurity Council, 2003, page 5) . At the preborder and border policy sites it deals with the prevention of unwanted organisms that may be unintentionally introduced with imported goods. The Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act (1996) , in contrast, stipulates the process by which new organisms can be intentionally introduced, through a detailed application process.
Due to the tempospatialities of gorse as a pest plant that has been present within New Zealand's national borders for some time and is extensively distributed, it is governed through the rationalities and practices of`internal pest management'. The significant governing institutions are the regional councils, who have pest management responsibilities on all public and private land within their area of jurisdiction, and DoC, which manages pests on Crown Land. There are sixteen regional councils across New Zealand, with regional environmental governance functions of which pest management is just one. (4) Formed through the 1989 Local Government Consultation, it was advised that wherever possible the boundaries between regional council jurisdictions should be constituted by natural boundaries. These often follow the tops of hills, which if above the bush line can act as a natural barrier to weed spread. This gives greater ecological relevance to the internal political organisation of pest plant management.
Categorising gorse as a boundary control pest plant Internal pest management is organised and legated through the preparation of Regional Pest Management Strategies (RPMSs), following a formal methodology written into the Biosecurity Act (1993). The purpose of the RPMS is``to provide a strategic and statutory framework for efficient and effective management of plant and animal pests'' (ARC, 2002, page 9) . RPMSs detail the species/subspecies that will be targeted for pest management, and the precise control intentions and methodology for each.
RPMSs greatly expand the realm of calculation and visibility within pest management. As Donaldson and Wood (2004) argue, surveillant biosecurity is about the establishment of categories, and in order to be eligible for inclusion in the RPMS, a plant must first be designated as a pest. This is the first process of categorisation: defining the distinction between a benign plant and a pest plant. It must be demonstrated that the plant is capable of causing``a serious adverse and unintended effect'' on one or more of the following:`i . economic wellbeing; or ii. the viability of threatened species of organisms, the survival and distribution of indigenous plants or animals, or the sustainability of natural and developed ecosystems, ecological processes, and biological diversity; or iii. soil resources or water quality; or iv. human health or the recreational value of the natural environment; or v. the relationship of Maori and their culture and traditions with their ancestral lands, waters, sites, waahi tapu, and taonga'' [Biosecurity Act 1993, section 72(c)]. These criteria reveal the breadth of ways in which nonnative species are considered to have potential to impact New Zealand adversely, reflecting an underlying shift from an agricultural to an ecological focus for biosecurity justification (Williams and West, 2000) . Scientific understandings are explicitly drawn together with a range of other values, giving biosecurity policies the capacity to recognise value or nuisance in different contexts. By enshrining a formal codified methodology for determining a pest within the legislation itself, rather than this being the preserve of science, the Biosecurity Act (1993) displays both transparency and flexibility in allowing responses to changing and newly perceived biosecurity threats (Jack Craw, Biosecurity Manager for ARC, interview 1, 2005). There is no need, for example, to develop new legislation in response to each new concern, thus incorporating a`knowing of indeterminacy' (Hinchliffe, 2001) into the heart of the biosecurity legislative system.
With the advent of the Biosecurity Act (1993) and these expanded criteria, the numbers and types of pest plants that confronted regional councils greatly increased. Complexity therefore emerges due to the proliferation of sites and species, threats and threatened, prompted by this expanded understanding of risk and harm. Gorse qualifies as a pest, the first stage of the RPMS categorisation process, due to its economic impact on agriculture and forestry, its ecological impacts, and its impact on recreationöfor example, through overgrowing walking tracks. The material significance of this only emerges, however, through the second step in the categorisation process: the placement of pest plants within a hierarchy of control categories.
The categorisation process is detailed and multitiered. A process for screening nominated pests based on the criteria above was developed for use by regional councils. This model considers the adverse effects of a pest, the biological characteristics of a pest, and the distribution of a pest. Based on this assessment, plants are classified according to proposed management approaches. All pest plants in RPMSs are banned from sale, propagation, display, and distribution in their regions. Plants placed in the highest level category are termed`total control' or`eradication' pest plants. For these plants full control and removal are mandatory, with the work funded and carried out by regional councils themselves. African Feather Grass (Pennisetum macrourum) and Old Man's Beard (Clematis vitalba) are examples of total control pest plants within the Auckland region. At the lower end of the control hierarchy arè surveillance' pest plants, which landowners are`encouraged' to remove from their properties, although this is not a legal requirement (ARC, 2002, pages 27^29) . Through rationalising their approach to pest management in this way, regional councils can respond to greater numbers of pests. Under the 2002^07 RPMS, ARC has a total of 133 plants divided between these categories.
Across the RPMSs of different regional councils, gorse is most frequently categorised as a`containment pest plant'/`boundary control pest plant'. Landowners are required to remove gorse plants to within a specified distance from a neighbour's boundary: 10 m for Environment Canterbury, Environment Bay of Plenty (BOP) and Hawke's Bay Regional Council. The objective of this category is not to eradicate gorse from the region, or even to reduce its prevalence, but to prevent it spreading onto a neighbour's land. The farm becomes the basic territorial unit of control, and the existing physical boundaries between properties become crucially significant (Donaldson and Wood, 2004) . The twist here is that it can be the physical integrity of the fence itself that is being protected, rather than the territory beyond:`G orse is definitely invasive in a boundary situation.
[It] can be destructive to fencing '' (Environment BOP, 2002, page 46) .`W e rarely if ever ask farmers to control gorse unless it's against the fence-line, and that's just so they don't damage the fence'' (John Mather, Plant Biosecurity Manager, Environment BOP Regional Council, interview 2005). For a plant imported as a living fence in itself, this is a considerable fall from grace. Gorse is now confronting a country full of physical boundaries, albeit many of which it has already crossed. These boundaries are not simply about exclusion, however, as they distinguish sites where gorse is tolerated, as much as where it is not. The key`site' where gorse is not tolerated is actually the boundary itself, rather than the space which this demarcates. In the following section I detail the particular knowledge practices that explain why, despite the multiple ways in which gorse qualifies as a pest, its level of institutionally ascribed attention is so low.
Spatiotemporalities of control categories
This contemporary context of the careful determination both of pest status and of the placement of pests in a hierarchy of control categories differs from previous practices of pest management. Regional councils and their predecessors, noxious plant boards, formerly had`unlimited money' to spend on pests such as gorse. Jack Craw described the shift from this situation:`T he legislation, the 1993 Biosecurity Act changed that ... it said you have to justify how you're spending the money, you have to say who the beneficiaries are, etc. Go for things you think you can exterminate quickly ... . So the switch really dates from that'' (interview 1, 2005) .
Through the requirement that the costs of pest control within RPMSs are fully justified, regional councils were forced to consider the best return for their investment of time and money. This has led to the development of a specific set of knowledge practices used to associate the costs of control to stages of plant naturalisation: cost^benefit analysis (CBA), and the`infestation-curve model.'
The infestation-curve model diagrammatically represents the increase in the population of a plant over time, through different stages of naturalisation.``Many pests and diseases tend to follow a well defined, very simplified`S' shaped pattern'' (Williams, 1997, page 15) , with a lag phase as the plant establishes and begins to expand, followed by a rapid explosion as it finds suitable habitats, and then a levelling off as these habitats are saturated. In early stages of naturalisation, a plant will be occupying few of its available ecological niches. At this stage eradication efforts are easier, cheaper, and more likely to result in the successful removal of the plant overall. Gorse is an example of a plant at the opposite end of the infestation-curve model. Over the time that it has been in New Zealand, it has reached most if not all of its available ecological niches. Horizons Regional Council (2001, page 80) states that gorse plants are found frequently throughout the region``in nearly every expected habitat'',``an estimated 278,000 hectares is infested with gorse.'' At this point in the infestation-curve model it is more costly to undertake weed control work, and the outcomes are less significant as complete eradication is unlikely. The concept of`benefit' within the CBA is therefore not only assessed as the extent to which a pest plant impacts on the criteria listed above, but also the extent to which its prevalence can be reduced, or its spread prevented. It is not simply identity attributes assigned to the pest plants themselves that determine their categorisation within RPMSs, but also understandings of the costs and the capacity of human actions to effect natural change.
The infestation-curve model is used to justify a policy distinction between what are termed`weed-led' (originally`species-led') and`site-led' control approaches. (5) The majority of regional council activities are organised according to a weed-led approach (ARC, 2002) . This ascribes a level of control to low-incident, high-threat species that applies across the region, regardless of the site where they are growing:`W eed-led says that we are going to control this weed wherever it is, the value of the site is immaterial. We're controlling it because we believe and we've got rational systematic research which says that the impact on the conservation estate would be huge, so we're going to try and kill it, no matter'' (Peter Williams, Landcare Research botanist, interview 2005). Within this approach it is the categorisation of the pest plant that becomes the crucial determining distinction within the hierarchy of pest plant control designations described. For those determined as high threat, such as pest plants in the total control category, the scale of spatialised boundary maintenance is increased to the national or regional border. This homogenises internal space for these plants, removing the significance and physicality of boundaries between nature reserves, forestry land, agricultural land, and urban gardens. For a weed-led approach, it is therefore the plant that is``subject to categorisations that defined specific actions and restrictions'', rather than the space (Donaldson and Wood, 2004, page 384) . However, as these are lowprevalence pest plants, this produces a spatial focus for control work at points at which new weeds emerge. When coupled with contemporary concern over environmental pest plants emanating from the domestic garden, this spatial focus has moved from rural production areas to places in and near human habitation:
``It's more an urban focus, or peri-urban. That's where there's more activity. Yeah, half native, half introduced, sometimes called wasteland, sometimes other values, wetland. All the messed up bits and not quite so messed up, the edges'' (Peter Williams, interview 2005).
As the numbers of a species start to rise along the infestation-curve model (with a corresponding increase in cost and decrease in likelihood of full eradication) the imperative for a weed-led strategy drops, but the imperative for a site-led strategy grows. This is when a suite of pest plants, including those designated in low-threat categories, are all controlled on high-value sites. These site-led places might include, for example, particular reserve areas with highly rated environmental values:`S o once a weed becomes so widespread, like gorse, you only control it in places where the values of the place you want to protect are being impacted on'' (Peter Williams, interview 2005). For a site-led approach, it is the site that is categorised as`high value'; the internal categorical differentiation between pest plants becomes less important, while the initial binary between`pest plant' and`benign plant' is critical. The physical boundaries of the nature reserve become vital, as pest plants are tolerated on one side of the boundary and not on the other. This produces a spatialised heterogeneous landscape of inclusions and exclusions, a greater complexity in the type of boundary, and a smaller scale of divisions.
This discussion of the political rationalities involved in constructing a detailed and differentiated response to pest plants has disrupted a simple schema of boundary imposition and associated`failure' to accommodate socionatural indeterminacy, by emphasising the spatiotemporal sensitivity and flexibility of the categorisation process. This is aligned with Enticott's (2008) account of biosecurity practices in the management of bovine tuberculosis, in which he argues that biosecurity draws on multiple configurations of space and natural agency. The categorisation practices described also give nonhumans a status in the decision-making process. The failure of control techniques and the extensive spread of gorse has occurred despite the best biosecurity-like efforts of farmers, noxious plant officers, and politicians over more than 150 years (Bagge, 2000) . In the ways described, the spatiotemporality gorse has achieved is now determining the contemporary political response. Gorse is not, however, alone in influencing institutional biosecurity practices. In the next section I discuss further ways in which the representation of biosecurity as an expert-only, rigid process is alteredöthis time, through the impact of public knowledges and participation.
Destabilising authoritative decision making
There is little discussion of the role of public values in emerging social science accounts of biosecurity, an omission which constructs biosecurity as an expert practice imposed top-down on publics whose values remain unaccounted for. These publics become represented as the victims of governance strategies which hurt them``economically, socially, personally, spiritually'' (Law, 2006, page 235; Nerlich and Wright, 2006) , or fail and expose them to disease (Hinchliffe, 2001) , or treat them as agents of transmission (Donaldson and Wood, 2004) . In contrast, by paying attention to the RPMS review process for gorse, more positive modes of public involvement in biosecurity can be explored.
Regional councils are close to their voter base as they are comprised of elected representatives and funded through ratepayer taxes. The final inclusion of gorse within an RPMS and its placement within the hierarchy of control categories is therefore dependent on negotiations. This occurs through the informal diffuse pressure of`public opinion', felt and interpreted in a myriad ways, but crucially also through a formalised review process.
RPMSs are reviewed every five years. Regional councils each follow the same broad process, stipulated in sections 72 and 77 of the Biosecurity Act (1993) (Environment BOP, 2003) . This begins with the release of a discussion document for public submissions, which details the regional council's approach to pest management (Environment BOP, 2002) . The discussion document goes out to other agencies with pest control interests, such as Biosecurity New Zealand and DoC, as well as`the public'. This may be supported by structured public consultation, involving public workshops. Submissions are then received, which may challenge the inclusion or omission of particular species, or their placement in particular hierarchical control categories. Next, the proposed RPMS is developed and formally notified by the regional council under the Biosecurity Act (1993) . After a final schedule of public hearings and submissions, the council deliberates, and decisions are finalised and notified. Submitters are then given fifteen working days to appeal the strategy (ARC, 2002) . The reassessment of legislated pest control regionally every five years through this review process is remarkable, particularly in comparison with the UK model (Jack Craw, interview 2, 2005) .
Through this process the control category assigned to gorse is further destabilised. Movement between categories becomes possible not just through scientific understandings of the stages of plant invasion, or internal policy judgments of related costs, but also by exposing the weighing of these considerations to public debate. The proximity and required responsiveness of regional councils to their voter base are used to explain why gorse is still on most RPMS lists:`b ecause of the political situation in the countryside there is still pressure to control widespread weeds'' (Peter Williams, interview 2005) . This is despite the`common sense' of those working in the plant biosecurity establishment. Phil Dawson, a weed technical officer working for DoC, exemplifies this opinion:`I t's not a common sense action. It's a plant they [landowners] can kill, do it themselves and be responsible for it themselvesöso why should the rest of the region subsidise it? (6) Shouldn't it be spent on things which are not yet a problem? '' (interview 2, 2005) . For gorse, its widespread distribution has contributed to its low-level control designation through the rationalities of expert-knowledge practices. However, even this allocation of resources is questioned by institutional actors. This widespread distribution also leads to its greater public visibility. With its bright yellow flowers, gorse paints the landscape, growing along roads, in gullies, and on hillsides. It elicits the attention of the public more than the recently escaped, low-prevalence, high-control pest plant. It seems the more obvious candidate for attention in the public eye, yet is ostensibly ignored by regional councils. This has ramifications for public perceptions of the dedication and effectiveness of regional councils' approach to pest plants overall (Mike Harre¨, ARC Plant Biosecurity Officer, interview 2005) . Cathy, an enthusiastic Christchurch-based domestic gardener, complained:`T here's all this publicity about getting rid of noxious weeds but when you drive around the countryside you see them on many of the waysides, you'll see gorse ... and the council haven't done anything about getting rid of them'' (interview 2005).
(6) The costs referred to here in the case of gorse are not incurred through direct control work, but through the costs of monitoring, surveillance, the provision of information and advice, and the regulatory costs of enforcing RPMS rules (ARC, 2002).
Conversely, it can be difficult to persuade some publics that plants not yet visibly acting as pests should be controlled or banned from sale. This can cause a disjuncture between``when things become a problem in the eyes of the public or the eyes of the scientific establishment'' (Ian Popay, weed ecologist for DoC, interview 2, 2005). In these ways, gorse is living up to the meaning of its Gaelic name:`to squabble'. It would be a mistake, however, to trace this conflict too rigidly. As Carolyn Lewis, Chairperson of the Biosecurity Institute, highlights, the CBA rationality can dictate low levels of control responses that are also difficult for biosecurity personnel to understand:`E veryone has to be aware of our limited resources and what we want to achieve. But if you've spent ten years of your life battling this particular species and then someone comes along and says`We can't tackle that species anymore because it's not giving value for money, we're just going to let it go and ignore it', then you feel like you've wasted ten years of your life'' (interview 2, 2005). One response has been the creation of a category within the RPMS hierarchy called the`community initiative pest plant' (ARC, 2002) . This allows for the inclusion or recategorisation of pest plants which community care groups wish to take responsibility for controlling in their local area. With the agreement of 75% of occupants within the defined area, gorse can be assigned the equivalent status of total control pest plant, with landowners required to destroy all gorse plants. The inclusion of other values in this way does not represent an attempt to produce a singular decision in an effort to reduce uncertainty (Hinchliffe, 2001 ) but, instead, allows for the possibilities of these values materialising in different ways in different places. This greater public involvement, which has led to increased control of gorse, counters Donaldson and Wood's (2004) suggestion that control geographies are only successful when coupled with a top-down decision-making and implementation process.
The geography of knowledge produced by the RPMS review process leads to the inclusion and exclusion of certain voices from the policy debate: there is an emphasis, for example, on the opinions of interest groups over those of individual members of the public. The eventual hegemony of the RPMS process is that regional councils have the final say. There is no requirement for them to adhere to submissions, but they must respond and justify their response. The review process could be seen as a way of making the public`allies' through the rhetoric of public involvement in decision making. It is also significant that it has been made easier for publics to enact greater biosecurity control than to ask for a reduction in control. The process has, however, had a real effect on the categorisation of gorse, through its placement in the RPMS control hierarchy, and through pockets of community-led removal programmes. The stipulation for public consultation has not necessarily produced`better' policy decisions, but it has made changes to the authoritative voice. As Hinchliffe (2001) argues, it is closure, not simply exclusion, that is undemocratic. Through these mechanisms of review and community responsibility, both temporal and spatial closure is prevented.
Distributing responsibility and enrolling multiple actors: the biological control of gorse Biological control, or biocontrol, the practice of importing a species'`natural' predators, has become a key approach utilised in the contemporary management of gorse. Counteracting the uncontrolled proliferation of one introduced species through the supposedly controlled proliferation of a second introduced species is one example of a biosecurity practice that does not rest on the surveillant control of human behaviour to control nonhumans (Donaldson and Wood, 2004) The first biocontrol agent targeting gorse was the Gorse seed weevil Apion ulicis, introduced in the 1930s (Bagge, 2000) . Eight different insects are currently used against gorse, including the Gorse colonial hard shoot moth (Pempelia genistella) and the Gorse pod moth (Cydia ulicetana). There have been a number successful schemes involving the rearing and release of Gorse spider mites (Tetranychus lintearius) by primary school children, transforming biosecurity control into an educative moment and distributing participation even further.
Like the plant it was brought in to control, the Gorse pod moth has unexpected side effects: it attacks``non-target'' plants (Hayes, 2005) . While the implications of this are currently being researched, concern is tempered as the focus of the moth is other nonnative pest plants, such as broom and lupin, and only at low levels. However, the moth does not seem to be attacking gorse at the expected levels either. One possible explanation which researchers are pursuing is related to the specific taxonomical spatialities of the gorse and the moth. The moths that were initially tested as host specific for import and release were from Yately Common in the UK. Moths from Portugal were later released to increase genetic diversity and improve climate matching. There are now suggestions from some taxonomists that the pod moth should be split into two species, and so it is possible that the Portuguese Gorse pod moth is behaving in a different way to its English counterpart (Hayes, 2005) . In addition, gorse in Portugal is also now understood to be a different subspecies from gorse in the UK. The unpredictable behaviour of the gorse and the moth cuts across ways of categorising and spatially ascribing natural identity through speciation, revealing the endless complexity of interrelationships between different species and different environments which biosecurity is attempting to control.
Questions of naturalness in new relations: gorse as a nursery plant
In this final empirical section I consider one way in which gorse itself has interjected in the construction of conceptual boundaries in New Zealand, and what this reveals about the flexibility of institutional biosecurity values and practices. The interactions between gorse, the New Zealand environment, and the biosecurity regime attain further complexity through the contested role of gorse as a nursery plant for native forest regeneration. This example reveals that while nonhumans may object to the stories and roles set for them, these do not always have disastrous results (Hinchliffe, 2001) .
The growth of native forest in New Zealand is enabled through the temporal sequence of vegetation succession with which gorse interacts:`G orse puts nitrogen in the soil, so native plants come up well. Then as gorse isn't shade tolerant it's killed off when the natives have grown'' (Walter Stahel, Plant Biosecurity Officer for Environment BOP, interview 2005). By fixing nitrogen in this manner, gorse is altering the chemical composition of the soil. Through the benefits which this provides certain native plants, gorse is challenging the ordered rationality of ecological nativism by unsettling the boundaries between native and alien through a relational change in its allies. Knowledge of this nurturing relationship has been supported by failed practices of biosecurity control:`W e've found from experience that where a farmer has mechanically slashed or scorched gorse, in those patches he still has a gorse problem. Where he left it, he now has an intact native forest'' (John Mather, Plant Biosecurity Manager for Environment BOP, interview 2005). The description of gorse as potentially`beneficial' emerges from the failure to control it as a`nuisance', demonstrating the indeterminate ways in which the impulse to control is caught up with the sociomateriality of its governing context. This development of knowledge through unpredictable`failures' exemplified by gorse has perhaps set a precedent. Walter Stahel, was`keeping an eye out' for similar patterns of bush regrowth through other pest plant infestations the council could not afford to clear (interview, 2005) . This form of experimentation in which the pest plant is in control disrupts a linear model of knowledge production (Hinchliffe, 2001 ). This is not to reproduce the na|« ve storyline of`nature knows best', that with the removal of human intervention, natural balance is restored. In the case of gorse, removal of control produces conflict over its`natural' credentials. Critics would claim that what results is a`generation' rather than regeneration:`T here is research which shows that if bush is regenerating through gorse, because of the nitrogen that's there, and because of the particular birds that are recruited by the gorse, the assemblage of plants will be different than if the gorse wasn't there. There are further examples of the support which gorse provides for culturally valued species. Gorse flowers are a valuable source of food for bees in places such as Canterbury, where it is one of the few plants to flower in early spring (Price, 1993) . A particular patch of gorse in the South Island is the only place in the world that hosts New Zealand's native insect`giant wetas' (Deinacrida spp),``so if it hadn't been for that gorse, they wouldn't have survived '' (Phil Dawson, interview 2, 2005) . Clark (2003) reminds us that the first irony of invasive biology in New Zealand was the vital role played by exotic weeds in stabilising soil eroded by introduced livestock, thus`saving' agriculture by ameliorating the damage they themselves were implicated in (see Guthrie-Smith, 1999 [1921 , page 276). Gorse was evidently first imported in the discursive role as`beneficial'. In the context of contemporary concerns, however, the support which gorse gives to native nature is a significant material and discursive twist. Despite the controversy, this debate reveals flexibility within institutional attitudes to gorse, fracturing the single institutional voice.
Conclusions
Biosecurity is an evolving practice, and corresponding academic analyses are in their infancy. At first glance, with its high-profile border-control systems and powerful legislation, New Zealand's biosecurity regime does seem to involve the imposition of static territorial boundaries onto a complex entanglement of people, plants, and differing values. It is doomed, it would seem, to failure. Through a detailed empirical engagement, however, what emerges is rather different. Instead of the inert, authoritative,`all-or-nothing' governing approach expected, by drawing together institutional practices, public negotiations, and the ongoing surprises brought by a host of nonhuman elements, space has been made for an alternative narrative.
Social science approaches to biosecurity have been informed by a retheorising of nature and environmental governance. These diverse theoretical currents have at once abandoned categorical practices for theorising nonhuman^human relations, and increasingly criticised the use of these conceptual and corresponding material boundaries in environmental management. However, while these approaches have broken out of established orthodoxies for understanding nature, they are in danger of producing a further orthodoxy in a pervading mistrust of all attempts to manage and govern nature. This works to reproduce an instinctive romanticism (Katz, 1998) . This prevailing antigovernance tone manifests in claims that the project of biosecurity hinges on thè`m aintenance of static territorial integrity'' (Donaldson and Wood, 2004, page 386) , that it fails to consider natural indeterminacy (Hinchliffe, 2001) , and is consequently inherently negative and failing policy. These accounts do not fully exhaust the ways in which biosecurity is practised today. This assessment should therefore be reassessed in the light of contemporary policy in New Zealand, which is more mobile, flexible, complex, and decentred than these critical discourses allow for.
Gorse has had mutually constitutive effects on biosecurity approaches. Its extensive spread throughout New Zealand is a product of exchanges and adaptations between the plant, environment, and human actions. Through the logic of population and costing models for species this distribution has informed the level of control ascribed by the contemporary governing process. An accommodation has therefore been made to this plant in policy that works reasonably well. These rationalities are political tools to allocate finite resources. Coupled with the temporal sensitivity of the RPMS review process and the ecologically appropriate spatiality of regional councils, I have argued that this inbuilt flexibility also represents an attempt to take seriously the strategies of plants and the changing, indeterminate time^space geographies of plant invasion. The variation which this produces between RPMS control categories leads to a complexity of overlapping physical and conceptual boundaries of differing permeability and mobility. This contradicts a picture of expert knowledges imposing an ill-fitting grid of standardisation on a complex, messy world. Through the effects of different spaces on different weeds subject to different control categories, what can seem to be a sharp polarisation of the New Zealand landscape between`natural' and agricultural' space is fractured.
The continuous review and consultation process, though undoubtedly partial, creates the possibility for other values to affect biosecurity decision making, keeping political debate open (Donaldson, 2008) . The inclusion of a`community-led' category is a tangible way for these other values to be put into practical action, preventing spatial closure and sidestepping the need for consensus (Hinchliffe, 2001) . The debates over natural' versus`gorse crop' native forest rupture`the biosecurity institution', which is shown to consist of individuals with sometimes opposing ethics, drawing on diverse experiences. This works against the tendency to attribute what are fragile and fractured institutional achievements to the``faceless corporation, scientific laboratory or regulatory authority'' (Whatmore, 1999, page 35) .
Many authors point to the multiplicity of biosecurity (Enticott, 2008; Hinchliffe and Bingham, 2008; Nerlich and Wright, 2006) . Gorse mobilises different actors from invasive plants in higher control categories in New Zealand, and the experiential agency of plants (Cloke and Jones, 2001; Hitchings, 2003; Hitchings and Jones, 2004) differs from what is the overriding focus of other accounts of biosecurity on the evocative world of humans, animals, bodies, and disease. My account perhaps also differs as I am dealing with biosecurity not as an`event' (Donaldson, 2008) but as an ongoing process. These relational contingencies are crucial. When Hinchliffe, therefore, argues that environmental policy making``tends to work with a more staid natural order'' (2001, page 199) it becomes important to consider those examples of biosecurity practice which successfully embody sociomaterial subtlety. Through New Zealand's historical depth of involvement managing biomaterial fluxes, what has evolved is a system that is more complex and accommodating to indeterminacy. The success of the regime can be attributed to biosecurity practice having been built around the continual possibility of failure: as entities slip through preborder preventative strategies, evade border control, and fail to be contained through eradication campaigns. Under the remit of pest management, species such as gorse inch their way ever up the infestationcurve model, and so the corresponding allocation of control responses shifts. This is inevitable as boundaries are inherently permeable, and biosecurity can only ever be an exercise in``propping up the leaning tower of Pisa'' (Carolyn Lewis, interview 2005) .
Overall, biosecurity practices in New Zealand produce a complexity of semipermeable control boundaries that are flexible and sensitive to the shifting spatiotemporal geographies of indeterminate entities, and to changing and competing human values. Our academic analyses need to be willing to reflect this. Hinchliffe and Bingham (2008, page 2) argue that attention to biosecurity failures allows social scientists to intervene productively in the making of current biosecurity practices. I have argued that by paying attention to biosecurity`success', and by deferring suspicions of all attempts to govern nature, critical social thought could itself learn from the sophistication of New Zealand's biosecurity policy making and implementation.
